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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARSON FORD SALES, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
J. TAYLOR SILVER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT I 
: ' • • • • • ' • - - • • • I 
Appeal from an Order of the Third District :-f l| 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, m 
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, . w 
presiding. * 1 
NATURE OF CASE 
This appeal alleges that § 78-6-10 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) which requires an appellant from Small Claims Court to 
perfect his appeal within five (5) days after entry of judgment 
while the District, City, and Justice Courts allow thirty (30) 
days for filing appeals from the same lawsuit filed therein 
denied Taylor Silver the equal protection of the law. 
No. 14391 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS 
!. on June 14. 1974, plaintiff Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 
commenced a lawsuit in the small claims court of 
seeRing
 ?197.66 damages from Taylor Silver by filing thexr 
June 5, 1974, affidavit. 
2 on July 11, 1974, trial was held before the Honorab. 
L e R o y „. Griffiths, Judge of the Small Claims Court of Murray 
•
 e+. ^ vlnr Silver in the amount City who entered judgment against Taylor 
of $106.23. 
3. on August 5, 1974, Taylor Silver through counsel 
filed a Notice of Appeal with the Hurray City Court. 
4 on December 15, 197 5, the Honorable Bryant H. Crof« 
judge of the District Court for Salt
 La.e County, on Larso 
Ford Sales' Motion and pursuant to S 7.-6-10 U.C.A. ,1953, 
i (Please note the Order prepar 
missed Taylor Silver's appeal. (Please n 
appearing for defendant" in that Cordon F. Esplin did appear 
for defendant as noted in the minute record). 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
• <-hat e 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated .( 1. Declaration that § '» ° xu' 
is unconstitutional. ' 
2 Declaration that appellants fro. Small Clarms Co. 
ffiUSt be allowed thirty ,3., -ys to perfect their appeals. 
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3. Ordering the District Court for Salt Lake County 
to reinstate Taylor Silver's appeal of the July 11, 1974, judg-
ment entered in the Small Claims Court of Murray City. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc., sought to recover $197.66 from 
Taylor Silver, a Utah resident, by filing a lawsuit in the 
Small Claims Court of Murray City. On June 14, 1974, the'Justice, 
City and District Courts would have had jurisdiction to decide 
the lawsuit if it had been filed in those courts (see juris-
diction: for Justice Courts § 78-5-2, U.C.A., (1953) for City 
Court § 78-4-14, U.C.A. (1953) and for District Court § 78-3-4, . 
U.C.A. (1953)). 
The challenged § 78-6-10 U.C.A. (1953) requires an ap-
pellant to file his notice "within five days from the entry of 
said judgment against him, appeal to the district court of the 
county in which said court is held." Rule 73(h) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals from the City and 
Justice Courts states, "An appeal may be taken to the district 
court from a final judgment rendered in a city or justice court 
within one month after notice of the entry of such judgment, 
or within such shorter time as may be provided by law". Rule 
73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, 
When an appeal is permitted from a district court 
to the Supreme Court, the time within which an appeal 
may be taken shall be one month from the entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from unless a shorter time 
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is provided by law, except that upon a showing of ex-
cusable neglect based on a failure of a party to lean 
of the entry of the judgment the district court in an; 
action may extend the time for appeal not exceeding 
one month from the original time herein prescribed. 
Thus, the laws of Utah allow an appellant thirty (30) days to 
appeal a judicial decision from the courts of original jurisdi 
ction except for the five (5) day requirement of § 78-6-10, 
U.C.A. for Small Claims Courts. (All underlining in the pre-
ceeding paragraph was added by this author to the original). 
ARGUMENT 
Article I § 2 of the Utah Constitution requires the Ut 
government to protect all Utah citizens equally. Section 1 
of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution prohi 
the State of Utah from denying "any person within its jurisd: 
ction equal protection of the laws." § 78-6-10, U.C.A. (195: 
which states: 
The judgment of said court shall be conclusive 
upon the plaintiff unless a counter claim has 
been interposed. If the defendant is dissatis-
fied, he mayf within five days from the entry of 
said judgment against him, appeal to the district 
court of the county in which said court is held. 
Such district court may award the prevailing party 
on such appeal a reasonable attorneyfs fee to be / 
fixed by the court. 
denied appellant Taylor Silver the equal protection of the 
law. * 
POINT I. § 78-6-10, U.C.A. (1953) DOES NOT PROVIDE LIKE 
TREATMENT FOR ALL APPELLANTS FROM CIVIL LAW-
SUITS INVOLVING LESS THAN $200.00 FROM COURTS 
OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN THE STATE OF UTAH . 
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AND THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR CLASSI-
FYING ONLY APPELLANTS FROM SMALL CLAIMS 
COURT FOR EXPEDITED TREATMENT. 
Because of the supremecy clause in Article VI of the 
United States Constitution the United States Supreme Court is 
the ultimate authority on the United States Constitution. The 
Utah Supreme Court is likewise the ultimate authority in in-
terpreting the Utah Constitution. Because the equal protect*-
ion analysis of the two courts are similar the argument herein 
will cite only the teachings of the United States Supreme Court 
to avoid unnecessary repetition. The Supreme Court of the United 
States has traditionally been reluctant to set aside laws on 
the grounds of equal protection. The U. S. Supreme Court only 
required a law which classified individuals to accomplish its 
purpose in a reasonable manner. Railway Express Agency v. New 
York/ 336 US 106, 69 S Ct 463, 93 L ed 533 (1949). In Railway, 
the City of New York sought to prohibit advertising on motor 
vehicles except for vehicles engaged in the advertised business. 
The United States Supreme Court held in Railway that the effect 
of the New York regulation prohibiting Railway Express Agency 
or anyone else from advertising for other concerns on their 
trucks was an unreasonable classification to gain the legis-
lation's avowed purpose in promoting traffic safety when the 
vehicles of the other businesses could advertise on their own 
brucks. This is the traditional analysis used by the U. S. 
Supreme Court and the Utah court commonly known as the rational 
•elation requirement. This analysis looks at three things. 
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First, the purpose of the law (in Railway the purpose was promot 
ing traffic safety). Second, the reasonableness of the classi-
fication in relation to the purpose of the law. (in Railway 
the classification of vehicles displaying advertising for other 
businesses was held not to be reasonably related to the purpose 
of promoting traffic safety) And, third, the reasonableness 
of the laws effect (in Railway the law did not considerably 
improve traffic safety by reducing distraction to drivers but 
simply prohibited REA, etc., from deriving extra revenues from 
selling advertising on their trucks). 
In applying the rational relation requirement to the 
facts of this case we find: 
First, § 78-6-8, U.C.A.'s (1953)..."with the sole obje< 
of dispensing speedy justice between the parties"'is probably 
the purpose of § 78-6-10fs five (5) day time requirement. 
Second, § 78-6-10, U.C.A. (1953) only applies to appe] 
lants from Small Claims Courts which § 78-6-1, U.C.A. (1953) 
restricts civil lawsuits to amounts involving less than $200 
The classification then is appellants from Small Claims Cour 
The crucial question for this court to consider is whether t 
goal of speedy justice is reasonably furthered by only requ] 
ing small claims appellants to perfect their appeals within 
five (5) days. As Justice Douglas said for the majority in 
Railway, Id. 110, "It is by such practical considerations t 
on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies tt 
the question of equal protection is to be answered." The ] 
cticalities which this Court should consider are: 
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days to drop all business and come to Texas to defend himself 
in a suit. See also Roller v. Holly, 17 6 US 398, 44 L ed 20 S ( 
410 in which a non resident was given five (5) days to answer a 
lienors action of foreclosure. Notice of a hearing means nothi 
if the petitioner is practically denied the opportunity of maki 
an appearance. Mullane v» Central Hanover B & T Co., 339 US 3C 
94 L ed 865, 70 S Ct 652. 
Though five (5) days is speedy it is doubtful whether 
the goal of "speedy justice" or any justice, is furthered by 
requiring small claims appellants to perfect their appeals wit 
in five (5) days. 
Third, the effect of § 78-6-10, U.C.A. (1953) is to pre 
only small claims appellants from perfecting their appeals af1 
five days when appellants from the same judgment if entered 
in the Justice, City or District Courts have a full thirty (3 
days. This underinclusive and discriminatory classification 
is untenable* 
POINT II. ACCESS TO THE LEGAL PROCESS IS A FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT REQUIRING THE STATE TO SHOW A COMPEL-
LING JUSTIFICATION FOR ANY CLASSIFICATION. 
Historically, laws which classify individuals using•s' 
pect criteria or affect fundamental rights receive much stri 
scrutiny from the U. S. Supreme Court than the rational rela 
requirement. The majority of- the early strict scrutiny case 
involved racial classifications. The landmark decisions wh: 
treat access to the courts and equality in that access as a 
-8-
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a fundamental right of access to the court, then the court 
held that court's are governed by due process fairness and 
the Boddies could not be denied that access because of their 
poverty. 
Applying these principles to this appeal, the only way 
Taylor Silver is going to have redress from the judgment entere 
on June 11, 1974, in Murray City Small Claims Court is to be 
allowed an appeal in a higher court. Access to the appellate 
court is a fundamental right. The watering down of this right 
because Plaintiff Larson Ford chose the Small Claims Court 
instead of the Justice, City or District Court is the same 
type of invidious discrimination which has been abhorent to 
the Court in the cases cited and the cases involving race, 
alienage, and gender. Obtaining "speedy justice" is not even 
a rational basis for §78-6-10, U.C.A.'s classification let 
alone a compelling justification for diminishing Taylor Silvei 
fundamental right of access to an appellate court. "Once the 
to appellate review are established, they must be kept free o 
reasonable distinctions that can only impede open and equal a 
to the courts". Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 US 305, 16 L ed 2d 47 
86 S Ct 1497. 
CONCLUSION 
§ 78-6-10 U.C.A. (1953) does not provide the equal pr< 
tection of the laws for Small Claims Court appellants as re-
-10-
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Respectful • ><•;.•..
 ;, 
/v 
"GORDON F. ESPLIN / 
Attorney for Ann^llant 
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